

THE INFLUENCE OF C-POWER* ON HISTORY.

LECTURE NO. 3

MAKING THE MOST OF A CRYPTOLOGIC OPPORTUNITY.

K [PART 1 - INTRODUCTION]

Introduction to the Walter Cronkhite Television Story Entitled

"The Secret Message that Plunged America into War!" —

one of the episodes of his "You Are There!" Program
Columbia Broadcasting System
presented over the TV network

on
23 October 1955, repeated on 4 August 1957.

Inset attached
 I imagine that for many of ~~those~~ present ~~this morning~~ the name Alfred

Zimmermann, German Minister of Foreign Affairs in Berlin in the years 1914-1917, a

these days;

is not one that arouses much interest; in fact, I doubt that the name means
a great many
 anything to ~~most~~ of you. Yet, this gentleman, of whom I find it difficult to

say "may his soul rest in peace", was the diplomat whose ~~shamey~~ and unimaginative
 constituted a fine example of how not to make friends and

conduct of German foreign affairs in the three critical years I've mentioned.

Hans Zimmermann's culminating caper in career of bluntness

brought the United States of America into World War I as an active belligerent

(that); within dimonth after which all belante known to the Americans; The military
 on the side of the Allies; *and eight of the United States could easily have been*
in our country, that is, on the side

thrown to the other side--during the critical months of the year 1916--had the Germans

and particularly

I lived through that period and I know from first-hand
 Zimmermann been more astute. The consequences of such an event can hardly be

imagined;

it would be an understatement to say that possibly the course of

not

history would have been changed in a spectacular manner.

* "C-power" = Cryptologic power.

experience that there were several decisive
when it wouldn't have taken much to
the balance in favor of Germany.

What did Herr Zimmermann do or fail to do to merit so strong a statement
 What did he do or fail to do that tipped the balance suddenly in favor of Britain?
 as the one I've just made? What he did was to send a telegram on 16 January 1917
 to the German Ambassador in Washington--a telegram which was in German ^{a German office} ~~un~~iphered
 code and which was intercepted and solved by the British cryptanalytic unit in
 first, to relay front Americans might react if they learned the contents of his message; and, ^{and}
 London. What he failed to do was to see to it that the cryptosystem that had to
 New Zimmermann

be used to encrypt his message was technically sound enough to protect its
 In the aftermath of ~~the~~ discovery of his diplomatic blunderness the
 contents. ~~He~~ did and failed to do something else in connection with his now
 famous message--but of that, more later.

In order to prepare a proper background for the Zimmermann Telegram of
 16 January 1917--that's what it's called in history--I ^{will} ~~should~~ give you a brief
 picture of the situation from the outbreak of the war, on 1 August 1914, up
 about the time
 to ~~when~~ the telegram was sent. The picture I'm going to depict is a condens-
 ation of the excellent story set forth on pages 22 and 23 of Admiral Sir
 William James' book entitled The Eyes of the Navy, published in London in 1955.

By 1914 England had become so dependent on sea-borne imports that her people
 couldn't live, let alone wage war, for more than four or five weeks after her
 sea-routes were broken. Keeping these routes open was therefore the principal
 task of the British Navy. On the other hand, her principal enemy, Germany, was

not dependent on sea-borne imports, so that the British Navy's historic function of arresting an enemy's sea-borne trade lapsed after German shipping had found refuge in neutral ports.

There were, then, the British Grand Fleet and her hardly much inferior protagonist, the German High Seas Fleet, glaring at each other at a distance, and, although the Grand Fleet was becoming impatient and spoiling for a fight, the Germans didn't dare risk their fleet in major battle, ^{They} confining their attacks to sporadic forays by fast units and to minelaying.

German hopes of quick victory were shattered when trench warfare in France brought the war to a stalemate, and with the passing of each month it became clear that there could be no victory ~~for Germany~~ unless British overseas trade was cut off. Even if 1915, certain German circles, there were those who had ^{the} Government themselves what appeared to be a good idea, ^{to} ^{use} ^{submarines}. These people thought that the ^{success} of the German small submarine flotilla of 1914 pointed the way out without risking the High Seas fleet, and the good idea ^{was} to give highest priority to building submarines and use them to destroy British and all other shipping to cut off the British Isles.

The time wasn't ripe because it happened that civilized rules of maritime warfare required that no merchant ship be sunk without warning; and before the crew could take to life

boats. Observance of these rules had hitherto been required by both belligerents were being — respected

but for Germany this ~~had~~ severely reduced the destructive power of their ^{their}
ships on their own initiative ignored or they ^{That this was true} submarines and from time to time their commanders ^{were ordered to ignore them, in} goes almost without saying.

the case of the British merchantmen. But there were bound to be mistakes and, the ^{sometimes} with the result that the German unrestricted submarine warfare, as it came to be called, ships of neutrals were ^{also} sunk, ^{which} brought a wave of resentment against the German

Many bitter and ^{were sent} Government, ^{by our} ~~there were~~ acrimonious notes to that government, especially from the

~~our~~ Government, when ~~these~~ ships were sunk and specious excuses were given for Germany decided that ^{they} ~~couldn't pay the price of~~ unrestricted submarine warfare in the form of universal condemnation, such sinkings. American antagonism was heightened by the discovery of plots and

sabotage activities of German agents in America.

, even though unrestricted,

The powerful German submarine offensive in 1916 soon began to take a dreadful

Soon turn for the British. ^{became} the daily toll of ~~their~~ shipping losses was so heavy that it began to be obvious ^{that} unless some new tide set in -- or unless the United States of America could be

drawn into the war on the Allied side -- there could be only one end to it, and

that end would come soon.

Britain's First,

problem then was two-fold: (1) To labor prodigiously to gain mastery over

the German submarines; but this, it was recognized, would be a slow, a very slow,

Second,

process; (2) to try not to irritate or antagonize the United States, and certainly

were not to exasperate America as the Germans were. ^{was, of course,} The hope that the latter would ^{of course,} ~~the~~ Germans

"Were serious doubts being cast in America on the genuineness of the instructions to the German Minister in Mexico the authorities here might reconsider their position, but as Zimmermann has admitted their genuineness in the Reichstag this can hardly be the case."

7 That is what Hall greatly feared would happen--but his fears turned out

to be groundless.

sooner or later, the sooner the better, goad the ~~Americans~~^{us} into joining the war on the English side:

against Germany. The British were fortunate in both respects. It turned out that

thanks to the tremendous exertions of British shipbuilders, scientists, and sailors,

mastery over the submarines was attained, but ~~not~~^{that didn't come} until early in 1918. With this

phase of the British problem as I've just stated it, we shall not concern ourselves

today. It is with the other phase of it that my talk will deal.

Let's see how the Germans behaved so as to outrage ~~practically~~^{nearly} all Americans

and make President Wilson ask Congress to declare war on ~~them~~^{Germans}.

To this already related,

During the first years of submarine warfare the German Government respected

and followed the rules of civilized warfare.

the rights of neutral nations, but when faced with the prospect of losing the war

Germany felt forced to

unless all imports to the British Isles were cut off, ~~it~~ make a fateful decision.

at least

On 1 February 1917, ~~it~~ announced that as of that date ~~German~~^{i.} submarines would sink at sight ALL ships met on the high seas; in short, ~~it~~ proclaimed that unrestricted submarine warfare was being resumed. And it was ~~without~~^{further} add.

What did President Wilson do on receipt of the German proclamation? Why, ~~he~~

two days later,

on 3 February, he informed German Ambassador von Bernstorff that his career in the

United States was at an end. The United States had severed diplomatic relations

with Germany. Von Bernstorff's career in the United States was over; he

of course, American in Berlin go home. And Ambassador Gerard was called home. But note that severing diplomatic relations doesn't mean war — and it didn't in this case.

P L E A S E N O T E ! ! !

Advance Registrations MUST BE RECEIVED IN SECRETARY'S OFFICE PRIOR
TO SEPTEMBER 30TH. THEREAFTER THEY WILL BE RECEIVED BY

RICHARD D. HIGGINS

Archivist of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Chairman Local Arrangements Committee, SAA
State House, Boston 33, Massachusetts

Freedom on Chay AS. 16 - Jackie Bio ^{script 49}
then it's

Frigg People

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handlings

It was only natural for Britain to hope that we ~~of course, Britain had hoped~~ that the United States would now join the war ~~in~~, but, ~~as to say~~ held back. To many of us our ~~in~~ against Germany. ~~The~~ American position was quite humiliating because it was clear

~~we were unable to~~ it seemed that that ~~she could not give~~ our own merchantmen any protection whatever, that is, the ~~just~~ provide protection

~~couldn't without going to war,~~ ~~were~~ that was something ~~he~~ not to do; he said he was going President Wilson had promised ~~to keep America~~

But nothing he hadn't promised ~~to keep~~ ~~our~~ merchantmen sailing on the high seas ~~out of the war.~~

Hence, after the German declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare ~~American ships~~ kept within American harbors, ~~because~~ they were afraid to

~~because they would certainly leave and become helpless victims of submarine torpedoes--with large losses in~~

This situation was unbearable but ~~as~~ life to be expected. ~~As~~ I've said, President Wilson was determined to keep America ~~us~~

~~out of war~~ just ~~like~~ ~~as~~ the Scandinavian and certain other countries in Europe were

~~keeping out of it.~~ ~~If this you can see that President Wilson's~~ But his position was a very difficult one; his own ambassador

in London wrote in his diary:

"I predict that the President cannot be made to lift a finger for war—until the Germans should actually bombard one of our ports. It's cowardice or pacifism that holds him back every time." ~~Isolationism~~

On the whole, ~~American~~ ^{our} sympathies were with the Allies but the feelings of

a large German-American population had to be taken into account, especially when

British high-handed action, every once in a while, severely prejudiced their case.

Still, the President held back.

So the U.S. official attitude and position was, as I've indicated, very difficult.

One writer, commenting on President Wilson's conduct, said that he "was hesitating

on the brink of war, reluctant to plunge into it, clinging painfully to the idea

Solve an enemy's cryptosystem and as a result
It's a nice thing to have solved ~~the~~ code, or cipher, or enciphered code,
glean information which in pretty nearly all cases is indubitably authentic because it comes
and to have as a result some information right out of the horse's mouth; but

the information without arousing the enemy's suspicion as to its origin?

if you can't use ~~it~~, what good is it except, perhaps, for historical purposes?

(in the COMINT business we try our best to eat our cake and still have it; and we try to do that)

In other words, it's one thing to have COMINT—and another, to use it properly,

that is, so as not to dry up the source of the COMINT to continue to receive

the blessings which flow from your crypto-astuteness and good security.
Another way of putting the matter I'm going to discuss at some length is to say that
today trick pretty nearly every day. Our word hasn't been too bad and now
~~this afternoon~~ we're going to observe an excellent case illustrative of

two phenomena so enduring cryptologic
these ~~things~~ which are often hard to juggle, viz, using the COMINT
to its utmost advantage and at the same time protecting its ~~source~~ so as not to dry
~~it up at its source~~

of strict neutrality which seemed to be almost a part of his religion."

But maybe a bit of politics got mixed up with the religion because, as some of you may remember, the Democratic slogan for President Wilson's campaign for a second term was: "he kept us out of war". And let's not forget the other famous explanation he gave for keeping out of war: his statement that "there is such a thing as being too proud to fight!" I would try to defend that.

There was another factor we must keep in mind. For a large part of the United States, especially the Middle and Far West, the war in Europe was 3,000 miles across the Atlantic. It might as well have been on another planet so far as

~~the people who lived in those parts of our country were concerned.~~
 first (1) → which involved what I've termed "a
 from p. 6 → ~~from~~ ~~which~~ came the "cryptologic opportunity" which formed the principal part of
 first talk. → ~~first talk~~ It was an event (almost
 → in the title of my talk this morning, and which, overnight, it seems, the episode
~~informed~~ ~~the~~ ~~interception and solution by the British of the Zimmermann Telegram~~.
 entirely changed the picture. What was this opportunity? It was the disclosure
 event and the

Now, historians may disagree as to why the United States became a belligerent

even still
 in World War I; some of them even believe that we went in on the wrong side. But I
 think that most historians would now agree that it was the ~~solution~~ ^{use} of the Zimmermann
 Telegram and the brilliant way in which the British used it, that brought the United
 just in the nick of time, and on the right side —
 into the war when she was brought in, and brought her on the side of the Allies.
 could now be no doubt whatever as to the outcome of the war.

After severing diplomatic relations with
Germany something had to be done, of course,
to try to give our merchant ships some
protection and the question of arming them
to protect themselves was discussed.
The idea was to let the Navy provide
guns and trained gunners to handle them.
End on 26 February, President Wilson

addressed Congress in joint session to advocate that course of action. A bill known as the Armed Ships Bill was introduced in both Houses of Congress, and on 1 March it passed the House by a vote of 403 to 13. In the Senate it was less fortunate. It became the subject of acrimonious debate which finally developed into a filibuster led by

Senator La Follette of Wisconsin. The filibuster was successful and succeeded in preventing passage of the bill Wilson wanted. But the President still had a way open to him to do what he wished done - His Constitutional Powers to direct the Navy to furnish the guns and gunners for American ships that had to pass through the German-declared war zones.

"While the Armed Ship Bill was under discussion in Congress another ... event caused the greatest excitement throughout the country and aroused the people of the United States even more." Secretary of State Lansing wrote "that he denounced policy of submarine ruthlessness." What was this event? It was the one
⁽⁴⁾

is for the most part a strictly authentic and truthful account. J.
The Cronkhite film hardly needs comment to indicate the importance which
that it will portray

the publication of the Zimmermann Telegram exercised upon history, ^{because what}
almost immediately followed the disclosure of its contents

publication must inevitably be considered in any study of the causes which

led to ^{our} entry of the United States ~~of America~~ into ^{World War I and the role played} by our country.

The whole episode is replete with drama, and it has been reported in a really ^{powerful} one of the most dramatic of the

dramatic manner on a recently presented TV program that was one ^{of} the series.

by television

historical episodes recounted on Walter Cronkite's "You are There!" Some of you over WTOP-TV

may have seen it when the program was presented "live"; some of you may have seen it as recorded on motion-picture film, a copy of which I've borrowed from the Office

of Training, ^{and} Around-the-clock

of Training, ^{and} That film we now are about to see and hear. I'd like to add that

the Zimmermann Telegram of 16 January 1917 was the subject of a radio broadcast

by the British Broadcasting Corporation ^{as} recently as 26 May 1958. I'm

trying to get a transcript of that broadcast. I mention this to show you that

^{Subject} still ^{the} more than
the Zimmermann Telegram is quite a live ^{subject} today - 40 years later!

film.

Now let's have Walter Cronkhite's "You are There!" account of the Zimmermann

Telegram episode which he presented under the title "The secret message that

plunged America into war." After that I'll take up the background and detailed account of this spectacular and fateful cryptologic episode of World War I.

careful study by ^{cryptologists} ~~historians~~ as well as ^{historians} ~~cryptologists~~. It is a story replete with lessons on the disastrous consequences of weakness in "C-power", ^{as well as} ~~and with~~ lessons on the opportunities attendant upon ~~great~~ strength in "C-power". And, ~~in passing,~~ I may add that the story as it appears in the history books and popular accounts of the Zimmermann Telegram episode ^{contains} ~~contains~~ errors, in this, some of which will be pointed out today.

I think it correct to say that history attributes U.S. entry, ^{Our} ~~entry~~, on 6 April 1917, ^{World War I} into WWI as a belligerent on the side of the Allied Powers to the disclosure of the contents of the Zimmermann Telegram. Note that this statement is qualified

Just before the film showing started I said I'd take
of this episode and give you a
into; just after showing you the background, ~~and~~ detailed account
single
of this, the most spectacular and fatal, cryptologic
or of World War II, for that matter. I think that cryptologic history ~~for~~ ^{is} ~~was~~
episode of World War I, an episode of such importance in

You will recall that in the Cronkhite story
question was raised as to the delay between the date the ^{the reasons for}
Lummenmann Telegram was sent, 26 January 1917, and the
date its contents were communicated to the American
Ambassador, 24 February, a period of almost six weeks.
Why did it take so long? ^{This was a question} many persons asked. Wasn't that
suspicious? What kind of British shoddy work was
being covered up? Walter Cronkhite ^{tried to} gave an explanation
He said, that the story was held back until the Germans
changed their code. Then the Lummenmann Telegram could be
published without harm to British intelligence. Well, let's see. At the
point perhaps I should say that ^{the} principle idea behind my talk is to account for this
^{r - road} delay.

by a date, viz, 6 April 1917. Perhaps that would have come about without the

and

Zimmermann Telegram, sooner or later, for one reason or another, ~~but~~ most

because

probably ~~as a result~~ of German ruthlessness in the conduct of submarine warfare.

But "later" might have been too late, because after ~~February 1917 when~~

unrestricted submarine warfare started there wasn't much time left to help

Britain, ~~and her Allies, because England was being starved for food and munitions,~~

we

And if ~~America~~ had waited until England had been starved into starvation and
of course

capitulation, it is possible that ~~America~~ would never have entered ~~into~~ *the war.*

Or, if ~~it~~ was forced to ~~enter~~ by German arrogance, ~~it~~ might have been left to
face
~~fight~~ a powerful and jubilant Germany all alone. Who knows?

sent on 16 January 1917, its decrypted plain ~~text~~

The fact is, however, that the Zimmermann Telegram was published on
after publication

March 1st, and within a little over one month, on April 6th, ~~she~~ declared war on

According to practically all historians

Germany. There seems to be little doubt, therefore, that ~~America~~ entered the

Perhaps we in the cryptologic

war when ~~we~~ did because of the Zimmermann Telegram, ~~or~~ shall we say, rather,
field should be a bit more specific and say that ~~we~~ entered

as a consequence, on the one hand, of German obtuseness in affairs diplomatic

, we should add, that we entered into

and naivete in affairs cryptologic; and, on the other hand, ~~as the fruit of~~
first because of

, second, because of their

British astuteness in affairs diplomatic, and brilliance in affairs cryptologic. Or,

*Should these two reasons be interchanged in their order. See let you
be the judges.*

The Cronkhite film has, I'm sure, dramatically portrayed the contents of the Zimmermann Telegram had in Congress. It was only to be expected that question and doubt should be raised as to its

~~the~~ authenticity of the Zimmermann Telegram. The newspapers were full of

at first

denunciations and discussions of what many people regarded a complete hoax, a patent

1917, the day the Associated Press story appeared,

~~fraud.~~ In the Congressional Record the debate on March 1st takes up 22 whole

pages--all devoted to the question of the authenticity of the Zimmermann Telegram,

which had so far nothing to back it except the word of the Washington Correspondent

of the Associated Press, ~~for, make the disclosure~~

~~the fabrication had not been made on the authority of the State Department~~

~~Strange as it may seem, it had~~ Associated Press

~~at all. At least~~ ~~strangely~~ appeared merely as a dispatch ~~sent~~ sent broad-

~~what was widely distributed~~ You will recall this point in the ~~as~~ apparently, upon its own responsibility. ~~Read~~ Cronkhite film. ~~of Congressional~~

~~I am~~ ~~certain that for so many years~~ ~~should~~ the Zimmermann Telegram in a

~~But now let's lift~~ the secrecy veil a bit. It will be of interest to ~~the~~ ~~veil of secrecy. Let's begin with a brief~~

~~start~~ in with a brief story about how the British cryptologic organization got

started. I should tell you that according to the historical accounts, and I know they're true, the British Government had no crypto-

~~Read from Ewing lecture at Edinburgh 14 December 1927.~~ analytic organization in being in ~~World War I~~, like Be' out. Oh!

~~Read from Ewing Room 48 page 173-4.~~ Previously ~~they~~, I know there had been a long, long tradition of code and cipher solving by British Intelligence agencies ~~and~~ ⁵ and this is true. But that's another story and I don't ~~wish~~ ^{to} go into it at this time. All I want to say at ~~this moment~~ ^{being} ~~now~~ is that there was no cryptanalytic organization in the British Government when war came in 1914. First as

19

There was no official cryptologic agency in Washington at the time of the American involvement which we entered World War I as a belligerent in April 1917. In both cases there had to be improvisation with amateurs taking the leading roles, not professionals. Let me read from a letter dated - make this well - August 23, 1958 written to me by Cindi A. G. Denniston, who was for a number of years before World War II, and for a couple of years during that war the head of the British crypt-analytic organization.

copy from B.L.T.

See worked beginning
But do remember

Cindi Denniston's mention of Sir Alfred Ewing requires elaboration. You'll find a good deal of information about him in a book by his son, published in 1939, after some clearance with the authorities. The book is subtitled The Man of Room 40: The life of Sir Alfred Ewing (Hutchinson & Co., London, 1939). He's mentioned in several other books, and, in particular, a book published in 1955 by Admiral Sir William James, entitled Eyes of the Navy. This book devotes a good deal of space to the part played by Ewing in World War I. Let me quote from that book:

p. 24 - 1st par.

After ~~had~~ a few paragraphs on Codes and Ciphers, there follows this paragraph:

bottom of p. 25 + top 3 on p. 26

* * * * *

- p. 28 - 3 pages specifically for intercepting enemy radio signals

If one radio receiving station was set up - by amateurs, too, but we would go into that and this first station was eventually expanded into 14 stations in the British Isles. Later three overseas stations were established.

[James, p. 29 - 3 pages + top per on p. 30]

(1a)

Believe it or not, according to ~~Jones~~, Ewing's work for a number of months was entirely a private enterprise effort. It is not clear whether he and his small band of amateurs were paid. — I must assume, somehow or other, ~~Ewing's~~ ^{a man who soon afterwards} they were, ~~perhaps~~ what James meant, and he says so, was that "the small organization did not come under any Director or Sea Lord. This situation was changed when Ewing's ~~the~~ group became a section of the Naval Intelligence under the overall direction of ^{of} gained a great deal of publicity as a result of the work of the people under him, Admiral Sir W. Reginald Hall. Ewing continued to be the head of the group until he became Chancellor of Edinburgh University two years later.

Ewing and his small team were university men — not naval officers; as a result their translations of German naval signals were strange things in the eyes of the very few men in the Naval Operations staff to whom the translations went. And, of course, the gifted ^{cryptanalysts} amateurs became the butt of jokes and it was a long time before Admiral Hall was able to break down the prejudice against their work. The amusing thing to note is that Hall had assigned a Navy Captain to put the translations into proper naval

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until November 1917, when he not only was allowed in Room 40 but became Hall's representative in charge of the staff of cryptographers.


Language — but that officer wasn't permitted to have access to the room where the cryptanalysts worked or to have any personal contact with them. It is also reminiscent of certain early days in the history of our own cryptanalytic organization to learn that for a good while many months only one person received the translations — the Chief of Staff, to whom they were personally handed in a locked book! But now it's high time I got down to the real cryptologic details which had been shrouded in mystery for almost ten years before the certain amount of information began to leak out. Because available, when the veil of secrecy was lifted a bit by a story in the November issue of a most clairvoyant American magazine called World's Work, published the final installment of a book by Burton J. Hendrick entitled The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page. Since then other accounts have appeared, perhaps the best and certainly the latest one being that in Admiral Sir William James' book, The Eyes of the Navy, which I've mentioned. But let's begin with the version given in the Hendrick account because it's pretty accurate, having been based upon certain telegrams exchanged between our ambassador in London and the State Department in Washington but also because it's quite dramatic.

Present

I think Walter Cronkite's story ~~was based~~ ^{used a lot} of information that appeared first in this Hendrick account. And in passing I might quote ~~it~~ from an address speech delivered on 6 November 1925 by Lord Balfour who, speaking at a luncheon given at Edinburgh University said, as reported in The Scotsman of 7 November 1925:

[see me
p. 240 Ewing]

Soon we shall learn the part Balfour played in our story of the Zimmermann Telegram.



material in
Here copy, p. 23 & 24 to end of telegram right
Page, 24
Col p. 24.

World's Work and from time to time make comments.

at the moment

We shall not concern ourselves with the steps taken by President Wilson

Associated Press

and Secretary Lansing, culminating in the publication by the A.P. of the text

of the Zimmermann Telegram. Our attention will be concentrated upon the minute

details of the manner in which the message was intercepted and solved.

*[Copy part of p. 24 of] 3rd para p. 25 to point indicated at
(Continue reading from Hendrick, p. 24 "manner in which" . . . etc to 8th line,
with*

"the most fateful message sent to America during the war." Go on with following

from p. 26, 1st col . . . "In the British Admiralty this Nauen-Sayville

thoroughfare was known as 'the main line'; it was the most direct and consequently

the one most used for sending German dispatches to the United States."

Hendrick cites no authority for the statement that the Zimmermann was

transmitted by radio from Nauen to Sayville. There is very good reason to doubt

it. *not available.*

A few hours after outbreak of war the British, who've always recognized

the importance of control of communication channels as well as sea lanes took

immediate steps to isolate Germany from the rest of the World that lay beyond the

oceans, by cutting and diverting to her own service the two German cables across the Atlantic, leaving only indirect channels of communication with her ambassador at Washington. These were four in number.

(1) ^{Post} ^{Germany to New York}
Radio from Nauen, Sayville, Long Island, and Tuckerton, New Jersey. Both routes were supervised by the U.S. and were well supervised to protect our neutrality.

(2) ^{Post} ^{Cable from Germany via Berlin-Stockholm-Buenos Aires, Washington}
but this route was secret from U.S. although there is positive evidence that it was quite

well-known to the British from the first days of its use, for the cable from Stockholm people, so Jamison told me, as "the Swedish Roundabout." to Buenos Aires passed through England; and the route was popularly called by Room 40

(3) ^{Another cable route} ^{to}
Via Berlin, Copenhagen, Washington. This cable also touched

English soil. This was a very unusual channel for the Germans because it could be used only with the knowledge and cooperation of the U.S. ^{U.S. Government.} more about that later.

The last route

(4) Involved inserting ~~of~~ secret text in ordinary news dispatches we learned about it when this method (this was what we may call a "concealment system) and was disclosed after the war by Berstorff himself.

Now from Nauen to Sayville or Tuckerton; its use as to the first method, the use of the radio channel was prohibited except and I am glad to say that the supervision under American supervision/exercised by American authorities was very detailed and effective.

Hendrick is absolutely wrong when he says (p. 25, 1st column) ". . . how little this

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prohibition interfered with the Germans is shown by the use they made of

the Long Island station for this, the most fateful message sent to America

during the war." I have very carefully searched every available record and

have found not the slightest evidence that this channel was actually used.

~~and~~ the German accounts have been examined as well as American. ~~and now~~

in learning just how the supervision was exercised. ~~the Chiffre. 9972. Read from p. 7 and 8 or~~

I suggest you study his brochure on the Zimmermann Telegram (pages 7 and 8). I think you'll agree that great care brochure, para checked. was taken by the authorities who had the responsibility of seeing to it that we lived up to our international obligations under strict neutrality. No, the Zimmermann Telegram wasn't sent via that route, although

Hendrik's account makes it plausible by saying:

~~Hendrik p. 25, col 2 beginning~~
~~See 25, Col. 2. "On the 16th of January, 1917 . . . etc. whole~~

~~column to 1st 2 lines p. 26).~~ Does Hendrik want to imply Bernstorff, this lure which the Mexican President Carranza was to swallow? added this precious bit of enticement. No, Hendrik's explanation is quite wrong, it is, in fact, misleading and perhaps intentionally flat and disingenuous. We shall soon learn the real explanation for the

gaps and doubtful points in the text of the message as first intercepted. It will go a long way to explaining the 6-weeks' delay we've been trying to explain.

We come now to the second communication channel used by the German

Government etc. . . . bottom p. 8 of brochure ~~to end of line at top p. 9~~

~~feel we~~

~~Propaganda on British program from propaganda
agents from our [unclear] post office mostly to [unclear] propaganda
[unclear] of [unclear] coming from [unclear] many of them~~

~~came to know all about~~

There is plenty of evidence that the British ~~knew~~ of this circuitous route it happened to be decodes of messages that passed over this route

Admiral Hall's

~~later appeared among the hundreds in the affidavit by Admiral W.R. Hall in the records of the Mixed Claims Commission set up after the war~~

~~Many passed over the Berlin-Stockholm-Baltimore-Washington route. What messages the Swedish Roundabout, the~~

~~the Germans did was to hand their coded telegrams over to their Swedish Minister to Germany; he~~

~~friends in Washington and in Berlin; the Swedish Ambassador ~~Minister~~~~

~~to Stockholm addressed to his embodied the German code groups in a message apparently all their own~~

~~from Stockholm it went to the Swedish Ambassador in using a disguise that consisted of enciphering the German code groups~~

~~Buenos Aires who turned it over to his German colleague in that city. The German Minister in Buenos Aires then forwarded the message to Bernstorff in Berlin, but before doing so he applied a process of systematic alteration to the code groups, hoping that the differences~~

~~between Swedish and German code groups would not be noted.~~

~~But I think the British noted the disguise even before the message left Europe—remember that the cable from Stockholm to Buenos Aires occurred to either the Swedes or the Germans that the cables touched~~

~~By the way the disguise was a pretty thin one; only the three central letters of 5-digit code groups were changed and systematically. England. And of course, it didn't dawn on the Germans that their code~~

could be unravelled and read by anybody not possessing a copy of the code-

I found that book—certainly not by stupid Englishmen. And also, by the way, the disguise procedure began as early as in the summer of 1915.

The Hendrik account would make it appear as if the Zimmerman Telegram

This routing delivery only
~~received special treatment to insure its receipt but it is clear from~~

the German records alone that the transmission of important messages by

with German Foreign Office Communications.
more than one route was routine procedure with ^{the} Berghorstif. But Hendrik

says:

without quote

Read from p. 26 of Hendrik, Column 1. *Hendrik's statement "In many*

*capitals German messages were frequently put in Swedish cipher and sent to
Swedish Ministers..."*

implies that the British read Swedish codes, too. Now it would be easy to believe

*[etc. p. 10 of brochure] 4 para + to point on p. 11 marked stop
at end of p.*

Read from p. 18 of brochure *Now it would be easy*

*One of these two pieces of evidence I'm going to skip
over with the mere statement that it involves the publication
by our State Department on 8 September 1911 of certain messages famous in
history now as the German "Pfundsverzettel" or "sink without trace" messages.
We come now to the third and most interesting of the Zimmermann*

*That the Cionkhite story reported so dramatically as that
Telegram routings—the one used with cooperation of the State Department. I quote
from the Hendrik narrative:*

*[see me] Page 11 of brochure, the small type indicates
Read from last line, 1st column, p. 26 Hendrik matter big. "The Germans
and continue on p. 124/3 to
point marked stop here"*

Hendrik makes it appear that obtaining permission to use State Department line.

facilities was a rather simple matter

and place p. 13 marked "stop here".

*I am in a position to say categorically that
the State Department was indeed careful in placing its communication*

facilities at the disposal of the Germans. Mr. Lansing not only realized etc.

*[see me] Content with matter in
Read from p. 14 brochure - one para only. → 2d para on p. 14*

... or codes

We come now to a study of the code used for the Zimmermann Telegram.
 Note the plural - "Codes" - that's very important in this case, as you shall see.
 And first, ~~as~~ its passage from Berlin to Washington: there can be no
 question that the message, ^{which carried the Zimmermann Telegram}
^{it bore the No. 158)} was the one which had

been appended to Berlin-Washington No. 157, and which ^{was} ~~had been~~ sent via
 State Department channels. As I've already said, the British Government

has officially never published any account of the interception and solution

of the Zimmermann Telegram by its cryptologic agency commonly referred to as

~~Room 40.~~ But when we study very intently telegrams that passed between
 the British and American Governments dealing with the Zimmermann Telegram

as related in the Hendrik account - and more especially now, the account

~~The Author's Foreword to Admiral James' book,~~

contained in ~~book~~ ^{recently published} only three years ago by a close

~~associate and war-time colleague of Admiral Hall. This is the book, Eyes~~
~~that illuminate the dark or dubious points in the story.~~
~~of the Navy, by Admiral Sir William James.~~

~~Admiral James in his forward says:~~

~~Read from p. xi and xii to point marked~~

But Admiral James was careful. Even though, as he says, he had no
 access to unreleased official papers and there ^{fore} ~~as he says~~, it wasn't

I'm fortunate to be able to show you what Mrs. de Grey looked like. In my many talks with him not once did he mention the role he played in the reading of the Zimmermann Telegram - nor did anyone else in the organization (over)

in which he was ~~the~~ Deputy ~~Captain~~
to Sir Edward Travis, the Chief.
I have no photograph of the
Reverend Montgomery to show you.
But Nigel de Grey was said to look
the part of a character in Dickens or in
~~a~~ spine-chilling mystery — ~~encountered~~
in book or on stage.

necessary for him to obtain official approval for publishing his book, he did submit it for some sort of blessing, if not approval, ~~as this memo to report~~ ^{in London} dated 15 December from our ~~then Deputy~~ Senior Liaison Officer to GCHQ who said: " ; clearly shows:

~~Read from~~ Larkin memo.
"A" attached

PP Apparently
~~And perhaps it's not strange to say~~ Admiral James himself ~~doesn't~~ ^{didn't}

know the delicate and interesting technical points about the Zimmermann Telegram which remained obscure or in doubt ^{in my own mind at least, if not, in the} until he published his book.

~~the same~~ Said of :
And ~~otherwise~~ can be about his clarification, --unintentional, I'm sure ^{of}

other dubious points about the history and operations of Room 46 DEB. But we can't go into these except as they deal with or impinge upon ^{But we shall have to confine ourselves to the verifiable facts about} involved in the cryptology of the Zimmermann Telegram.

Let's begin by quoting from Admiral James' account. (James, p. 136 --

~~Saa wa~~

"Then early in the New Year (read p. 136 and 137 to point indicated and comment re the truth of what James says about the source of the DeGrey-Montgomery message. (Incidentally, describe DeGrey)."

~~I don't understand~~ There are reasons to believe that the version ^{of the Zimmermann Telegram you've} ~~that we have just seen~~ came from the British copy of the State Department message containing Berlin's

Nos. 157 and 158 to Washington--but I don't think it would ~~have been~~ polite

~~at the time~~ or even now to ~~say~~ or intimate ~~now~~ that the British were also

intercepting and studying messages of the U.S. Government! I wouldn't even mention such an idea were it not a fact that soon after we came into the war our ally Britain officially told us that our soldiers weren't safe!

~~Then go on with last paragraph p. 137 and continue with p. 138 and 139~~

← James →

to point indicated, at middle of p. 137.

Berstorff tried desperately to have Berlin change its decision about unrestricted submarine warfare—to no avail.

On 1 February, Berstorff ~~presented~~ officially handed in his government's announcement that unrestricted submarine warfare would begin that day. President Wilson broke off relations two days later, on 3 February.

~~Let's continue with the story as Admiral James tells it:~~
~~Resume reading James, p. 140, Middle paragraph only.~~

Hall then took steps to obtain the additional evidence that he required in the event of an exposure ^{at Mr. T} in the circumstances and telegraphed to his secret agent in Mexico City to

get all copies of Berstorff's telegrams to Eckhardt since 18 January. These

were sent to Washington and forwarded by cable to London in British cipher. No hitch developed in this nice arrangement.

~~James goes on:~~ "So much progress with the reconstruction of the code had

been made that by February 19 Hall had in his hands an almost perfect trans-

cript, and James then gives the text of the Zimmermann Telegram as published in the history books.

Mr "T" was a British operative or secret agent in Mexico City. In a rather odd way, ^{and quite by accident} he turned out to be a most useful character in the drama of the Zimmerman Telegram.

Copy Patron marked on p. 134-135
When "H" was replaced by secret agent "T," the good work went on, and that's how Hall in London was able to get a copy of the Zimmerman Telegram in which Bernstorff in the form it was sent from Washington to Eckhardt in Mexico City. It turned out to be of crucial importance! As Admiral James says (p. 141):

But James is throwing a little dust in our eyes. The version of the

Zimmermann Telegram that was finally published was not the version that

was in the telegram from Zimmermann to Berstorff, which was in code 7588,

whereas

but the equivalent version that was in the telegram from Berstorff to

although quite similar in content, a much one-part code known as Code, Eckhardt, and that was in the older and much simpler 13040 code.

Here's the message in its 13040 clothing:

Read the message entire as given on p. 141 James.

message as on p. 141 " and continue

Continue with p. 142 down to stop. Omit next paragraph and continue

as follows:

But by this time Hall had information that the German-Americans in
the US were extremely active in their endeavors to stay the President's

hand. He felt that the time had come for immediate action and formally
as regards bringing the Zimmermann Telegram to the attention of President Wilson
pressed for a decision. On 26 February he received Balfour's authority

to handle the whole matter as he saw fit. James continues the story:

"Prolonged discussion with Dr Page etc..

Continue with p. 143 James--whole page, and top 2 lines on p. 144, then
and 145 to end of 3d para. on p. 145
continue

We've already heard the contents of the message from Page, the
American Ambassador in London, to the President and Secretary of State so

I won't repeat it now. You'll recall that in that telegram Page stated:

that "early in the war the British Government etc. read extracted and marked paragraphs on p. 144, James.

But now listen to James: (p. 145) "It was not the case etc. -- just that
 p. 18 of brochure beginning" When Ambassador Page
 paragraph and the next one and then continue from p. 16 of F-M brochure and

read all the way to bottom of page 16 of brochure]

place around the cryptanalytic fact every security safeguard he could devise. If necessary

Nobody can blame Hall for trying to put everyone including Page, the
 he would put off or the wrong trail anybody ~~else~~ he thought might jeopardize security, soas
 President, the Secretary of State, off on the wrong trail and to cover the

tracks of Room 45. At the time this brochure [hold up F-M brochure] was

written we didn't know all the facts—we were ^{using} ~~making~~ inferences and deductions.

We said:

2 marked paras of brochure

Read two marked paragraphs on p. 17 of brochure.

We felt that "cipher book"

The statement that a codebook -- or at least some sort of code document --

or captured must have contained but we didn't know just how
 was found must contain an element of truth, because here is what the Ewing
 turned over to us
 which, and the British, soon after we entered Hawaii, a copy of their
~~intercepted~~ 13040 code, didn't say anything about it having
 been ~~so~~ ^{so} and trusted upon the basis of ~~it~~ another code that they'd
 But that's exactly what they'd done as I have since then established.
 For instance, in ~~Ewing~~ (p. 16) we read the following:

Note the illuminating statement

Ewing says that the captured material enabled the workers in Room 45 to

read much enemy diplomatic correspondence, "thus providing a starting-point from

which to penetrate, one after another, the German Foreign Office Ciphers."

Admiral too,
On the other hand, James gives us much more specific and valuable
information on this point and I think it is accurate. (James, pp. 69-70)

James pp. 69-70 "In April etc
Read James p. 69 to top p. 70. "In April 1915 something
With the aid of our able archivists I've been able to dig out of the old
If I'd had more time to prepare for these talks before coming out
files of World War I. here it is.
~~I would have sent German Code 13949; put with my slides, etc.~~ It's
an interesting document. ~~as also is Englisher Chiffre 9972 and Code 7500...~~
~~these are all in our archives now.~~

But to get back to the Zimmermann Telegram itself again, you will recall
that I said it was published in all the important newspapers of the world
In pro-German circles the telegram was immediately denounced as a forgery
on March 1st, 1917. After acrimonious debate a resolution was passed by
the Congress that the President be asked to state the source of the information.
He replied the same evening through his Secretary of State as follows:

[]

Read James, p. 147 -- Lansing and next paragraph: marked ~~Zimmermann~~ ~~in~~ ~~Foreign~~ ~~Ministry~~
on p. 148 to end
Zimmermann in a statement before the Reichstag made a long, involved
and foolish apology for his inept conduct, ~~this was his second~~ and he
gave error because if he'd [usent matter on next page]
Read James p. 148, marked paragraph.

How naive! How could such a naive man rise to be head of the Foreign
Office of a great and powerful state? It will hardly astonish you that
Zimmermann continued to use Code 13949 — and that he soon
lost his job as Foreign Minister.²⁴

Continue with Names, p. 149 and 158 to end of quoted matter at top of p. 158.

p. 158.

If Zimmermann had been really smart he would have denounced the telegram as a forgery, fraud, and product of British duplicity and chicanery-- even if only to smoke the British out and make them prove the authenticity of the telegram by disclosing exactly how the message and the information contained had been in it was obtained.

[Note from James] p. 148 "American reaction... end of p. 158..."
 That is what Hall greatly feared would happen--but his fears turned out to be groundless. Zimmermann was too dumb, too slow, too inept, and he soon... lost his job.

Now go back to F-M brochure, p. 17 to end of 2d para.